The Policy Logic Behind PM Hum Manet's Decision To Keep Public Bus Under State Control

Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Manet recently rejected a proposal to transfer Phnom Penh’s public bus service to a private company, citing concerns that privatization could lead to higher fares and negatively affect citizens. The groups most vulnerable to such changes would likely be students, monks, elderly citizens, workers, and other passengers who currently benefit from free or low-cost access to public transportation. At present, Phnom Penh City Bus maintains a flat fare of 1,500 KHR (around US$0.37) per ride regardless of distance, making it one of the few forms of affordable urban transportation accessible to lower-income groups.

By rejecting the proposal, the Prime Minister made a direct and highly visible intervention aimed at protecting citizens’ disposable income at a time when many households are already facing pressure from global inflation and rising living costs. However, this decision also means the state must continue carrying the operational deficit of the public transport system while remaining responsible for service quality, infrastructure management, and long-term sustainability.

The deeper economic reality behind Hun Manet’s decision is that public transit systems are structurally designed to operate at a loss because their core purpose is social mobility rather than profit maximization. In most major cities, public buses are not expected to generate strong commercial returns. Instead, they function as a form of social infrastructure that allows students to access education, workers to reach employment, and low-income citizens to remain connected to economic opportunities. In this sense, the Cambodian government is making a deliberate policy choice to retain an unknown financial burden on the state’s balance sheet, prioritizing urban social equity over commercial profitability rather than transferring the operational burden to a private operator that may prioritize financial viability through fare increases, route reductions, or cuts to socially necessary but commercially unprofitable services.

While Cambodia’s current model succeeds in preserving affordability, the public bus system still faces significant structural weaknesses. Before the 2025 Cambodia–Thailand border tensions, buses generally followed the schedules shown on Google Maps and bus applications with reasonable consistency. Although inconsistency rarely occurred during regular peak hours, such as when students traveled to school or returned home, route management often became less reliable during normal operating hours. The issue became especially visible before and after major national events, particularly when large numbers of people traveled back to their hometowns. Such unpredictability, such as buses that were expected to arrive every 15 minutes sometimes being delayed to 30 minutes or cannot even be found on apps, created inconvenience for passengers and reflected broader issues related to operational management, human resource capacity, coordination, and technological development.

A useful comparison can be found in Singapore’s public transport system. Contrary to common assumptions, Singapore does not fully privatize its public bus services. Instead, the government maintains control over fare structures, route planning, infrastructure, and service standards, while private operators compete through performance-based contracts to manage daily operations. Under this model, the state protects affordability and public access while leveraging private-sector efficiency in areas such as fleet maintenance, scheduling, digital tracking systems, and workforce management.

The deeper lesson for Cambodia, therefore, may not be whether public transportation should be “public” or “private,” but rather how to design a governance model that balances social protection with operational efficiency.