This framing is not a historical analogy and not an identity claim. It is a behavioral metaphor, used to describe a security doctrine and pattern of action, not to equate states, histories, or societies. In the 20 days, Thailand’s military conduct toward Cambodia, and the official language used to justify it, has made that pattern increasingly explicit.
Since 7 December 2025, Thailand has pursued a rapid and multi-domain military escalation against Cambodia. Initial clashes involving heavy ground fire in Preah Vihear Province were followed by air operations, naval or coastal activity, and strikes deep inside undisputed Cambodian territory. Thai forces employed tanks, mortars, and F-16 fighter aircraft. Civilian infrastructure was affected, including the destruction of bridges in Pursat Province and later in Siem Reap Province, approximately 70 kilometres from the Thai border. Siem Reap does not border Thailand and is home to Angkor Wat, a UNESCO World Heritage site.
What distinguishes this escalation is not only its scale, but the strategic narrative used to legitimise it. Thai military and political authorities have repeatedly framed Cambodia as a persistent and long-term threat to Thai security and sovereignty. According to Reuters, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul publicly supported the military’s planned operations and remained non-committal on diplomatic de-escalation. Thailand’s army stated that its objective was to cripple Cambodia’s military capability “for years to come.” Military statements characterised Thai actions as necessary exercises of self-defence in response to alleged Cambodian encroachment.
This framing expanded further when Thai authorities accused Cambodia of hosting scam centres and associated criminal infrastructure. Subsequent airstrikes were presented as security operations aimed at neutralising these alleged threats. However, reported strikes affected civilian areas and infrastructure, raising questions about how threat identification translated into target selection and how civilian harm was weighed within operational decision-making.
This sequence matters. First, Cambodia was framed as an enduring strategic threat. Second, military force was justified as a preventive and long-term solution. Third, allegations, such as scam activity, were introduced to broaden the scope of legitimate targets. Fourth, civilian harm was treated as a derivative rather than decisive constraint. This is not unique language in global security practice, but its appearance in Southeast Asia is consequential.
This is where the metaphor becomes analytically relevant. Israel is frequently described in policy analysis as a state that operates under a security doctrine defined by four elements: the identification of adversaries as existential threats; the justification of pre-emptive or disproportionate force under self-defence; the pursuit of long-term degradation of those adversaries’ capabilities; and the subordination of international mediation when it conflicts with security objectives. This doctrine has been used to justify sustained military campaigns against Hamas.
Thailand’s current conduct reflects a structurally similar framework. This does not make Thailand “Israel” in identity or context. It does, however, position Thailand as adopting an Israel-style security posture within ASEAN, one that treats a neighbouring state as a permanent threat to be neutralised, relies on sustained military pressure rather than parallel diplomacy, and reframes civilian impact as an acceptable by-product of long-term security objectives.
Author: Muyhong